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Abstract
Von Neumann’s psycho-physical parallelism requires the existence of
an interaction between subjective experiences and material systems. A
hypothesis is proposed that amends physics in a way that connects sub-
jective states with physical states, and a general model of the interaction
is provided. A specific example shows how the theory applies to pain
consciousness. The implications concerning quantum mechanical state
creation and reduction are discussed, and some mechanisms are suggested
to seed the process. An experiment that tests the hypothesis is described
elsewhere.
Introduction
I assume that there is a rough correspondence, or at least a working relationship,
between the subjective life of any creature and the objective world in which it
is a part. John von Neumann calls this a psycho-physical parallelism, according
to which the images of the creature’s psychic experience mirror the objects in
its physical environment [1]. Presumably, creature learning begins in infancy by
creating a parallelism of this kind that is practical and useful for the adult. For
this to happen, a conscious species must develop a rudimentary psycho-physical
parallelism at an early stage of evolution.
By consciousness I mean all that which is contained in the subjective or
psychic life of an individual. Consciousness is different from the physiological
state that gives rise to it, for although it is a by-product of the physical processes,
it is not itself a physical entity. It is the psycho part of the psycho-physical
parallelism.
Consciousness is widely believed to be epiphenomenal, which means that
it is created and choreographed by a physical body but cannot, conversely,
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influence the behavior of that body. If that were the case in any species including
our own, then there would be no point to a psycho-physical parallelism. It
would not then matter if a creature’s psychic life mirrored or failed to mirror its
physical environment, for having no influence, its psychic life would not matter
to anything at all.
The two fundamental disciplines of modern physics, quantum mechanics and
general relativity, are mechanically autonomous. They provide no mechanism
that would allow consciousness to influence the behavior of a physical body; and
accordingly, consciousness can only appear scientifically as an epiphenomenon.
Therefore, barring the acceptance of the miraculous principle of Pre-Established
Harmony proclaimed by Leibnitz, there is no reason to believe that the subjec-
tive life of a conscious being would in any way reflect the physical world in
which it lives. There is not even reason to believe that the subjective life of
a conscious being would be rational; and certainly, the appearance of rational
thinking that parallels the objective world would be enormously improbable. So
given the present scientific understanding, a psycho-physical parallelism would
exist only if there were an amazing and inexplicable harmony in nature of the
kind suggested by Leibnitz.
I do not accept ‘pre-established harmony’. I believe that subjectivity arises
naturally within the objective world in a way that results in a psycho-physical
parallelism, and that we can, at least partially, document the reasons for that
development. To do so, we will have to amend to physics.
The Parallel Principle
The following statement of the parallel principle asserts how subjectivity is
generally related to physiology in humans, and presumably in all conscious
species.
The subjective images and ideas of a conscious species are related to its
physiology in such a way as to allow the development of a working psycho-
physical parallelism at every stage of evolution.
For this parallelism to work, there must be some degree of mutual monitoring
between the psychological and physiological worlds to keep them together on
parallel tracks. This means that subjectivity must feed information back to the
underlying physiological system, correcting it on the evolutionary stage when it
does not create appropriate (i.e., parallel) images and ideas. Physiology must
respond to this instruction.
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The idea that mind and body must have evolved interactively was discussed
by William James, who believed that the evolution of “appropriate” subjective
feelings would be incomprehensible if feelings were biologically redundant [2].
On this model, our effort should initially focus on how this parallelism devel-
ops in primitive species. Our strategy will be to consider amendments to physics
that will satisfy the parallel principle in early organisms. Attention goes first to
the ways in which a creature that is fully automated might begin to experience
consciousness.
An automaton operates on the basis of a simple stimulus/response sequence,
where the success of a sequence is awarded to the survivor of the evolutionary
struggle. Suppose, as a result of mutation, an amended sequence appears in
the form stimulus/consciousness/response. The conscious experience in this
sequence does not have to be the sole determinant of the response, but we will
allow that it is influential; that is, that it will increase or decrease the likelihood
of one response or another. If the response favored by the newly introduced
consciousness is wrong (i.e., if it encourages an unfortunate response), then the
species will not survive; but if the favored response is right, then the species will
survive. In the end, a successful species will have a specific conscious experience
that is associated with a successful stimulus/response sequence, and this is the
signature of a psycho-physical parallelism. A more accurate formulation of the
parallel principle might be:
2nd Formulation: If an element of consciousness becomes associated with a
stimulus/response sequence in a species, and if it contributes to the long-term
survival of the species by enhancing or repressing a response, then the species
will have acquired a rudimentary psycho-physical parallelism.
Again, this is because a subjective state that enhances or represses a response
will enable the creature to learn (through evolution) to couple that ‘psycholog-
ical’ state with a successful ‘physiological’ response. It is my belief that the
psycho-physical parallelism that we identify with humans began in this way.
It must be emphasized that the conscious element in the above statement
is not just a circuitous way of talking about another (equivalent) physiological
configuration that is itself a response to the stimulation and a determinant of
the response. That would defeat our purpose by reestablishing an epiphenome-
nal interpretation; for again, the content of the conscious element would then be
irrelevant to any behavior. We say, rather, that it is the conscious element itself
that is associated with an enhanced or repressed response. That is not to say
that consciousness has an existence independent of physiology; for indeed, we
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assume that it arises out of physiology. But we claim that the qualitative prop-
erties of the experience are directly related to the enhancement or repression of
a response, and that that correspondence cannot be explained by contemporary
physics. One way of providing the required feedback is described in the final
sections on physics.
The General Model & Hypothesis
A model is shown graphically in fig. 1 in which a stimulus gives rise to two pos-
sible responses R and R′, together with a possible subjectve experience E. This
appears in two possible sequences, one being either R(E) or R′(nE), and another
being either R(nE) or R′(E), where nE indicates no associated experience.
R( )E
)ER’()E
R’( )
R( )E
Stimulus
repressed
survive
R( )
R’(
Stimulus
repressed
extinct
nE
nE
Figure 1
We now add a hypothesis concerning the experience E that, we will say in
this example, enhances a response. To put this hypothesis into play, it will be
necessary to amend the underlying physics in a way that will be explained in a
later section.
The General Hypothesis applied to an enhancing experience:
When the experience E appears in association with a response, it will “en-
hance” the response by increasing its probability relative to other responses.
Since the bracketed term nE means that there is no associated experience,
it produces no special effect.
The claimed influence of E increases the probability of the response R(E)
in the first sequence in fig. 1, and R′(E) in the second sequence. Because of
normalization, this effectively represses the responses R′(nE) and R(nE). We
make the further assumption that the response R is favored in the evolutionary
struggle, and R′ is not. Therefore, the only species that survives is one in which
the experience E is associated with a life affirming response R.
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It should be noted that the experiential mutation introducing E is capable
of advancing the evolution of the species in this example, and it does so without
the help of a mechanical mutation of the kind that advances an automaton.
That is, the sequence in fig. 1 might proceed as indicated without a mechanical
mutation also taking place. This does not mean that the evolutionary process is
thereafter dominated by experiential mutations in preference to mechanical ones.
However, it is possible that these two processes (mechanical and experiential)
operate independent of one another; and if that is so, they might also operate in
tandem. If that were historically so, then whatever the relative frequency of the
two process, the species would evolve faster than it would with either one of these
processes working by itself. We would then be able to say that if consciousness
is introduced in a way that gives rise to a psycho-physical parallelism, it will
always benefit evolution by increasing the speed with which a species adapts to
its environment.
A fanciful Example
An example that I use in previous papers is more specific [3,4]. It involves the
experience of “pain” that is assumed to decrease the probability of any response
to which it is associated. In the interest of concreteness, a fictitious encounter is
imagined between an ancient fish that is initially assumed to be an automaton,
and an electric probe that somehow exists in primordial waters. The probe
provides the stimulus that gives rise to two possible responses of the fish (1)
W-withdraw, or (2) C-continued contact.
A mutation is assumed to introduce the conscious experience of pain as-
sociated with one or the other of these responses. The sequence W(no pain)
or C(pain) therefore presents itself as a possibility together with the sequence
W(pain) or C(no pain). In the first case, C(pain) is repressed inasmuch as we re-
quire that pain always represses the response with which it occurs. This leaves a
painless withdrawal W(no pain) that will survive the evolutionary struggle inas-
much as it is a healthy response for the fish. In the second sequence, W(pain)
is repressed, leaving the fish in painless contact C(no pain) with the probe; and
this leads to the fish’s demise inasmuch as that response is unhealthy. The
result is the emergence of a species of fish that instinctively withdraws from a
probe, and at the same time, experiences a release from pain. We therefore see
the beginnings of a psycho-physical parallelism in which pain is coupled with a
dangerous behavior.
When I speak of “pain” in this example I do not necessarily refer to the
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painful experience known to humans. Different creatures might experience pain
differently. What is important about pain is the way that it is associated with
the repression of unhealthy of responses.
I have been alluding to the causal efficacy of consciousness by referring to
its ability to ‘enhance’ or ‘repress’ responses. I will continue to do so in the
interest of simplifying and unifying the discussion. However, strictly speaking,
one should only talk about possible “correspondences” or “associations” between
conscious experiences and physiological responses (or our models of physiological
responses). That’s because we can only hope to discover empirical relationships
at this point. We have no general theory that can explain the psycho-physical
interaction proposed here, and we may never have such a theory. It is even
possible that there is a third unknown (and unknowable) cause that is common
to these relationships [5]. I will nonetheless continue to speak of consciousness
as a ‘causal’ influence because that is the most heuristically effective way of
presenting this model.
The Physics
A stimulus that acts on a biological organism will generally create a quantum
mechanical superposition of body states over a wide range of possible responses1
[6, 7]. I call a superposition of this kind of an endogenous superposition. It
will consist of many competing physiological configurations, each supporting a
distinctive conscious state, and each with a specific quantum mechanical proba-
bility of being realized. The external stimulus therefore gives rise to an endoge-
nous superposition of states that are capable of supporting different degrees and
qualities of consciousness. The probability that one of these states is realized
is normally determined by quantum mechanics alone. However, I add a special
hypothesis concerning pain consciousness.
The Psycho-Physical Hypothesis applied to pain:
When pain consciousness is associated with a component of an endogenous
1It is frequently said that macroscopic states cannot be in quantum mechanical superpo-
sitions because they behave like classical mixtures (i.e., like classical statistical ensembles).
However, quantum mechanical interference terms do exist between these states when they are
taken together with correlated elements in their environment. The states in this entanglement
appear to be a classical mixture when the environmental variables are integrated out; but Joss
and Zeh call it an “improper mixture” because, globally considered, it is a bona fide quantum
mechanical superposition with distinct probability amplitudes. See refs. 6 and 7. It might
equally be called an “improper superposition”.
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superposition, it will repress that component relative to other ‘painless’ compo-
nents.
If more that one component contains pain consciousness, than the degree of
repression of each component will be a function of the intensity of the pain in
each. This hypothesis is entirely qualitative inasmuch as no data is available to
give us a measure of the degree of repression. It is further limited to one kind
of experience - pain consciousness. Presumably, pleasurable experiences are as-
sociated with enhanced behaviors; and more sophisticated experience/behavior
interactions are dealt with at later stages of evolution.
Again, the hypothesis is intended to be an amendment to the fundamental
mechanics. It provides feedback from conscious states to physiological states
that is essential if we believe that there is a naturally occurring psycho-physical
parallelism. The feedback cannot be thought of a euphemism for a physiologi-
cal activity that is ‘really’ the underlying cause of the influence; for barring a
Leibnizian miracle, a genuine psycho-physical interaction is necessary for there
to be a parallelism.
State Reduction
There is still no general agreement concerning how, why, or exactly when a
quantum mechanical wave function collapses upon measurement. The why of it
will not concern us here, but for the parallel principle to work we must choose
a reduction process that satisfies one important condition: namely, that state
reduction (or state collapse) cannot happen too quickly. A developing endoge-
nous state must have enough time to grow to macroscopic proportions; and it
must have enough time to mature sufficiently to support consciousness.
This condition is automatically satisfied if we adopt the state reduction ideas
of John von Neumann. Accordingly, (1) state reduction will not occur unless a
conscious observer is present and aware of the system. This means that an en-
dogenous macroscopic state will not collapse until it has matured sufficiently to
support a conscious observer; that is, until an internal self-observation is possi-
ble. This idea is sometimes said to imply that consciousness causes the collapse
of a quantum mechanical state function. As previously stated, I use terminology
like this myself; but one should be reminded that we are talking about empirical
relationships in which consciousness is only found to be associated with state
reduction in a certain way. With this qualification, I accept the von Neumann
account of state reduction. Without it, a psycho-physical parallelism would not
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be possible.
Seed Particles
There remains the question of how an endogenous quantum mechanical super-
position can be formed in the first place. Henry Stapp proposed that the calcium
ions that are needed to release neurotransmitters across a synaptic junction are
possible seed particles for the creation of such a superposition [8]. Because
of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, one of these small ions will grow to
many times its “classical” size during the time it takes for it to diffuse to the
vesicles containing neurotransmitters. The resulting uncertainty as to which
transmitters are released is passed on to the neurological level, and this results
in the macroscopic uncertainty implicit in an endogenous superposition.
Other seed mechanisms are possible. There are many migratory transmit-
ters that travel significant distances from their point of origin to receptors in
other parts of the body, and these can acquire Heisenberg uncertainties in posi-
tion. They are the steroids and peptides that move throughout the body, carried
along by blood or intercellular fluids. Many of these are small enough and travel
for a long enough time to be significantly affected by Heisenberg uncertainty.
This means that the time of a molecule/receptor attachment is governed by a
quantum mechanical probability distribution. This in turn leads to an uncertain
receptor response. To this extent, migratory transmitters guarantee the exis-
tence of a superposition of receptors in different stages of stimulation. When
the resulting uncertainties in all of the body’s receptors are taken together, the
result will be a wide-ranging endogenous superposition of possible body states2.
The Case of Pain
The endorphins produced by the body are migratory molecules that mediate
pain by seeking out and attaching to opiate receptors in the brain and other
2A migratory molecule spreads out spatially as it moves about, due to its Heisenberg
uncertainty of momentum. Its components interact strongly with the fluids in which it is
immersed, so they are also dispersed by such classical mechanisms as diffusion, turbulence
and laminar flow. Either way, the probability with which a given molecule attaches to a given
receptor is governed by quantum mechanical uncertainty . The resulting ensemble of receptor
states is an entanglement of seed molecules and the liquid environment in which they are
immersed. But when that environment is integrated out, thereby eliminating it as part of
the local (macroscopic) system, the resulting receptor states are found to lack the ability to
interfere with one another (see ref. 6, 7).
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parts of the body. These molecules are peptides that are small enough and gen-
erally travel far enough to seed endogenous quantum mechanical superpositions
that include a broad range of states with different degrees of pain conscious-
ness. Endorphins can therefore function as the pain suppressers in the fanciful
example of the fish, and this gives them a possible evolutionary role of some
importance. Opiate receptors have been found in very ancient species, going
back to the early vertebrates [9]. Since they serve no other purpose than to
stimulate analgesic and euphoric effects, and since they have such a pervasive
presence in all vertebrates, it is easy to believe that opiate receptors served a
compelling evolutionary purpose associated with the most elementary of con-
scious experiences3,4 [10].
Because of its (Heisenberg) uncertainty of position, a migrating endorphin
molecule has a less-than-one probability of attaching itself to an opiate receptor
at any given moment. So the total number of receptors that are turned on at
that moment is quantum mechanically uncertain. This number is a variable
of a quantum mechanical superposition, each component of which potentially
supports different degrees of pain consciousness. Our psycho-physical hypothesis
tells us that those components with a greater degree of pain will be repressed
relative to those with a lesser degree of pain; and as a result, the distribution of
states in the superposition will shift in the direction of states with lesser pain.
The probability that the subject will experience less pain is thereby increased,
thus establishing a connection between subjective experience and physiology as
required by the psycho-physical parallelism.
It is difficult to imagine how this theory can be tested if the only seed parti-
cles available are the calcium ions within neuron synapses. But small migrating
molecules are a different story. Exogenous opiates, such as codeine, morphine,
heroin also alleviate pain and/or give pleasure by attaching to opiate recep-
tors [11]. These molecules are small enough and they travel far enough to be
seed particles, and they are easier to manipulate experimentally. It is therefore
possible to test the above theory by injecting pharmacological doses of these
opiates into subjects, determining the extent to which they attach to receptors
in conscious subjects; and comparing this with their attachment in subjects
3In advanced species, receptors perform these functions as well as modify more sophisti-
cated moods in the direction of analgesia and euphoria. See ref. 10.
4The existence of ancient opiate receptors does not in itself prove the existence of con-
sciousness, inasmuch as an automaton might very well use these devices to modify a response
to certain kinds of stimuli. However, I believe that consciousness was introduced through
these devices. The extent to which they existed before that event, or came into existence as
party to that event, is not a question that I address here.
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who receive subpharmacological doses. The author has proposed an experi-
ment along these lines that injects synthetic opiates into humans using positron
emission tomography (PET), or into rats using autoradiography [12].
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